As it appears from the course of the political situation in Iraq, whether in Baghdad or in the rest of the provinces, the political process, as well as the mass protest process, are both in an impasse from which it is difficult to get out.

When we talk about the political process, we do not only mean the process of parties controlling power according to sectarian and national quotas, or according to partisan-sectarian-national consensuses in the distribution of senior state positions. Rather, we also mean the general mentality of people, regardless of their affiliations, as it is Apparently you can’t skip this section.

During 16 years of rule according to the quota system, a general popular social sectarian culture grew and strengthened, a culture that relies on religious, sectarian and national affiliations as standards for rejection and acceptance and granting or withholding confidence.

According to this mentality, people participated in the elections, gave their votes, and also expressed their opinions in various social media outlets.

Even in this, which was initially an uprising and then turned into protest demonstrations, the culture of quotas was present in the minds of the demonstrators despite their rejection of it, because people often derive their opinions from the lived reality and rely on it in their future perceptions and making their judgements. Nomination for the position of prime minister did not deviate from Within the framework of the culture of quotas, the matter remained confined to the boundaries of Shiite sectarian affiliation, even among the demonstrators.

The basic problem created by the political process is the quota mentality, which cannot be eliminated without adopting state secularism.

Not only by isolating religion from politics, but also by secularizing life, that is, secularizing social relations between people and demolishing the sectarian barriers that religious and political institutions built during long years of corrupt sectarian rule, as well as secularizing educational, cultural and social institutions.

The state cannot be successful or stable if people conduct their lives and relationships in accordance with the requirements and requirements of religion. This creates a contradiction that finds expression in people’s belief that religion is the solution to the problem of social justice when political parties fail due to their corruption.

Or for any reason or another in implementing its declared electoral programs, as happened in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood promoted, but the failure in managing the state was due to the state moving away from religion and that Islam is the solution.

In Lebanon, for example, the state is secular and has no official religion, but the system is sectarian, meaning that like the regime in Iraq, it is based on dividing the people into sectarian components that choose their representatives according to a quota mentality rooted in sectarian affiliation tendencies. This division carries within it the danger of civil war when political crises or sectarian-political conflicts occur, as happened in Lebanon or Iraq. If civil war occurs, the only beneficiaries of it are the sectarian politicians.

Who will be seen as the true representatives of the interests of their sects. They will also rise to the role of clerics and become famous stars whose stardom exceeds that of movie celebrities. This means that state secularism does not mean anything if the popular base is divided according to so-called components, as dividing the people into components only means establishing sectarianism.

The expression “state of citizenship,” whose slogan is raised by the demonstrators, loses its meaning if the state continues to conduct its affairs in accordance with the requirements of religion and rejects what contradicts it, as stipulated in the Iraqi constitution, many of whose clauses must be changed to be consistent with the requirements of state secularism, where the only affiliation is to the state as the sole representative of all people.

Only then will other affiliations wither and become merely personal inclinations that have no legal support except in a way that guarantees the rights to freedom of belief in a way that does not affect the freedom of others.

The major predicament that the Iraqis find themselves in is that, up to this moment, they have not been liberated from the shackles of religion nor from their sectarian affiliations. The political parties are not the only ones that listen attentively to the religious Friday speech and ask the religious authority of Najaf for support and support.

But the demonstrators also follow what you say and what you declare, and they often mention the name of the religious authority in television and newspaper interviews or when polling people’s opinions.

This means that political sectarianism exists in the popular mentality, as religious affiliation in itself is also sectarian affiliation, and when we share religious opinions and fatwas in politics, then we involve religion in politics.

It seems, after Abdul Mahdi resigned as Prime Minister, that the demonstrators do not have a clear vision of the shape of the state they want. They want nothing more than early elections in which the quota parliament will establish its electoral system and appoint the electoral commission for it.

But that will not change anything, as the idea of a state of components will remain as it is, the basis of sectarianism and sectarian affiliations, and it will not be easy to overcome the political Islamic parties that are supported religiously, financially, and regionally and are practiced in deception and forgery.